Category: NYU

COMPLETIONRELATIVISM All of these problems for a Fictionalist relativism about morality trace back to the assumption that our target utterance: ‘‘It would be wrongofPaul to steal Mark’s car’’ expresses a complete truth-evaluable proposition. Once that assumption is in place, there is no alternative but to embrace an Error Theory of that utterance, and, given a…

PROBLEMS FOR FICTIONALISTMORAL RELATIVISM I believe that this Fictionalist view of morality captures well what many have wanted to mean by the phrase ‘‘relativism about morality.’’ However, no sooner is it stated than it begins to come apart. Oneproblemseemsimmediate.Thejudgment: It would be wrong of Paul tosteal Mark’s car seems appropriately normative; but the judgment: In…

FACTUAL RELATIVISM If the preceding considerations are correct, it is implausible to construe relativism about a given domain either as the claim that the propositions of that domain are unexpectedly relational in character or as the claim that, while its propositions aren’t, its truth-conditions are. In a sense, a difficulty with such construals of relativism…

What is Relativism? PaulBoghossian INTRODUCTION Few philosophers have been tempted to be relativists about absolutely everything—although, we are told, there have been some notable exceptions (Protagoras). Manyphilosophers, however, have been tempted to be relativists about specific domains of discourse, especially about those domains that have a normative character. Gilbert Harman, for example, has defended a…

The Maze of Moral Relativism By Paul Boghossian  July 24, 2011 9:49 pm July 24, 2011 9:49 pm 277 The Stone is a forum for contemporary philosophers and other thinkers on issues both timely and timeless. Relativism about morality has come to play an increasingly important role in contemporary culture.  To many thoughtful people, and especially to those…

Consider someone who has somehow come to adopt the unreflective practice of inferring according to Prior’s introduction and elimination rules for the ‘tonk’ connective: 1. (I) A/A tonk B; (E) A tonk B/ B. If we suppose that we are allowed to use inferences in accord with these rules in mounting a justification for them,…

Default‐Reasonable Beliefs An increasingly influential thought these days runs along the following lines: It is a mistake to suppose that a belief is unreasonable or unjustified merely because it is not supported by some observation or argument. Some beliefs are simply ‘default reasonable,’ reasonable in and of themselves, without any supporting justification. In particular, the…

Knowledge of Logic Is it possible for us to know the fundamental truths of logic a priori? This question presupposes another: is it possible for us to know them at all, a priori or a posteriori? In the case of the fundamental truths of logic, there has always seemed to be a difficulty about this,…

This is a very interesting passage in all sorts of ways. It is 1970, and Kripke is clearly simply taking it for granted that philosophers appeal to intuitions, with he himself being a prominent example. The only controversy Kripke acknowledges is about the probative value of intuitions, and not their existence or the fact that…

Philosophy Without Intuitions? A Reply to Cappelen I Herman Cappelen (2012 ) has written a book that’s devoted to arguing against the following claim: Centrality (of Intuitions in Contemporary Philosophy): Contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (or as a source of evidence) for philosophical theories. In arguing against Centrality, Cappelen is not making…